But Allah Wouldn't Fly the Plane
EgyptAir Flight 990 Report Nails Copilot
The long, long-awaited final report by the NTSB, on the October 31, 1999 EgyptAir Flight 990 crash, impugns copilot Gameel el-Batouty, as the proximate cause of the loss of the plane. Citing cockpit voice recorder transcripts, the Board notes that el-Batouty repeatedly said, as he apparently fought off the pilot, "I rely on God." [That translation has been changed from the actual reference to the Almighty, used by the copilot, "Tawakkalt ala Allah," in the interest of political correctness --ed.] The problem for him and all the people he killed was, God wasn't about to interfere with his free will, which, apparently, was to crash the airplane. He should have known that, regardless his religious beliefs.

Officially speaking (excerpted from the Board), 
The National Transportation Safety Board has determined that the probable cause of the crash of EgyptAir flight 990 was the airplane's departure from normal cruise flight and subsequent impact with the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the relief first officer's flight control inputs. The reason for the relief first officer's actions was not determined.
EgyptAir flight 990, a Boeing 767-366ER, SU-GAP, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Nantucket, Massachusetts on October 31, 1999. The scheduled flight was being operated from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, to Cairo International Airport, Cairo, Egypt.
There were 14 crewmembers and 203 passengers. All on board were killed and the airplane was destroyed.
Because the crash occurred in international waters, the Egyptian government was initially responsible for the investigation under the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. However, the Egyptian government delegated the conduct of the investigation to the NTSB under the provisions of Annex 13.
The investigation into the cause of the crash has been quite extensive and has involved months of testing and research during which investigators evaluated various scenarios to determine the circumstances leading up to the crash.
On October 31, 1999, about 0152 eastern standard time (EST), EgyptAir Flight 990, a Boeing 767-366ER (767), SU-GAP, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 60 miles south of Nantucket, Massachusetts. EgyptAir flight 990 was being operated under the provisions of Egyptian Civil Aviation Regulations (ECAR) Part 121 and U.S. 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129 as a scheduled, international flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, New York, to Cairo International Airport, Cairo, Egypt.1 The flight departed JFK about 0120, with 4 flight crewmembers, 10 flight attendants and 203 passengers on board. All 217 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan...
According to the CVR transcript, about 0140 (20 minutes after takeoff), as the airplane was climbing to its assigned altitude, the relief first officer suggested that he relieve the command first officer at the controls, stating, “I’m not going to sleep at all. I might come and sit for two hours” and then, indicating that he wanted to fly his portion of the trip at that time. The command first officer stated, “But I, I slept. I slept” and the relief first officer stated, “You mean you’re not going to get up? You will get up, go and get some rest and come back. The command first officer then stated, “You should have told me, you should have told me this, Captain [relief first officer’s surname]. You should have said, [command first officer’s first name]. I will work first. Just leave me a message. Now I am going to sit beside you. I mean, now, I’ll sit by you on the seat. I am not sleepy. Take your time sleeping and when you wake up, whenever you wake up, come back, Captain.”
The relief first officer then stated, “I’ll come either way, come work the last few hours, and that’s all.” The command first officer responded, “No, that's not the point, it’s not like that, if you want to sit here, there’s no problem.” The relief first officer stated, “I’ll come back to you, I mean, I will eat and come back, all right?”
The command first officer responded, “Fine, look here, sir. Why don’t you come so that, you want them to bring your dinner here, and I’ll go to sleep [in the cabin]?” The relief first officer stated, “That’s good.” The command first officer then stated to the command captain, “with your permission, Captain?”
At 0140:56, the CVR recorded the sound of the cockpit door operating. About 1 second later, the command first officer stated in a soft voice, "Do you see how he does whatever he pleases?" At 0141:09, the command first officer stated, "No, he does whatever he pleases. Some days he doesn’t work at all." At 0141:51, the CVR again recorded the sound of the cockpit door operating. Sounds recorded during the next minute by the CVR (including a whirring sound similar to an electric seat motor operating, a clicking sound similar to a seat belt operating, and some conversation) indicated that the command first officer vacated and the relief first officer moved into the first officer’s seat. Flight data recorder (FDR) and radar data indicated that the airplane leveled at its assigned altitude of FL 330 at 0144:27. At 0147:19, New York ARTCC instructed EgyptAir flight 990 to change radio frequencies for better communication coverage. The command captain of EgyptAir flight 990 acknowledged and reported on the new frequency at 0147:39.8
At 0147:55, the relief first officer stated, "Look, here’s the new first officer’s pen. Give it to him please. God spare you," and, at 0147:58, someone responded, "yeah."
At 0148:03, the command captain stated, .Excuse me, [nickname for relief first officer], while I take a quick trip to the toilet, before it gets crowded. While they are eating, and I’ll be back to you. While the command captain was speaking, the relief first officer responded, "Go ahead please," and the CVR recorded the sound of an electric seat motor as the captain maneuvered to leave his seat and the cockpit. At 0148:18.55, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the cockpit door operating.
At 0148:30, about 11 seconds after the captain left the cockpit, the CVR recorded an unintelligible comment. Ten seconds later (about 0148:40), the relief first officer stated quietly, "I rely on God." There were no sounds or events recorded by the flight recorders that would indicate that an airplane anomaly or other unusual circumstance preceded the relief first officer’s statement, “I rely on God.” At 0149:18, the CVR recorded the sound of an electric seat motor. FDR data indicated that, at 0149:45 (27 seconds later), the autopilot was disconnected. Aside from the very slight movement of both elevators (the left elevator moved from about a 0.7° to about a 0.5° nose-up deflection, and the right elevator moved from about a 0.35° nose-up to about a 0.3° nose-down deflection) [highlighting added] and the airplane’s corresponding slight nose-down pitch change, which were recorded within the first second after autopilot disconnect, and a very slow (0.5° per second) left roll rate, the airplane remained essentially in level flight about FL 330 for about 8 seconds after the autopilot was disconnected. At 0149:48, the relief first officer again stated quietly, "I rely on God." At 0149:53, the throttle levers were moved from their cruise power setting to idle, and, at 0149:54, the FDR recorded an abrupt nose-down elevator movement and a very slight movement of the inboard ailerons. Subsequently, the airplane began to rapidly pitch nose down and descend.
Between 0149:57 and 0150:05, the relief first officer quietly repeated, “I rely on God.” seven additional times.
During this time, as a result of the nose-down elevator movement, the airplane’s load factor decreased from about 1 to about 0.2 G.
Between 0150:04 and 0150:05 (about 10 to 11 seconds after the initial nose-down movement of the elevators), the FDR recorded additional, slightly larger inboard aileron movements, and the elevators started moving further in the nose-down direction. Immediately after the FDR recorded the increased nose-down elevator movement, the CVR recorded the sounds of the captain asking loudly (beginning at 0150:06), “What’s happening? What’s happening?” as he returned to the cockpit.
The airplane’s load factor decreased further as a result of the increased nose-down elevator deflection, reaching negative G loads (about -0.2 G) between 0150:06 and 0150:07.
During this time (and while the captain was still speaking [at 0150:07]), the relief first officer stated for the tenth time, “I rely on God.” Additionally, the CVR transcript indicated that beginning at 0150:07, the CVR recorded the “sound of numerous thumps and clinks” which continued for about 15 seconds.
According to the CVR and FDR data, at 0150:08, as the airplane exceeded its maximum operating airspeed (0.86 Mach), a master warning alarm began to sound. (The warning continued until the FDR and CVR stopped recording at 0150:36.64 and 0150:38.47, respectively.)
Also at 0150:08, the relief first officer stated quietly for the eleventh and final time, "I rely on God." and the captain repeated his question, "What's happening?" At 0150:15, the captain again asked, “What’s happening, [relief first officer’s first name]? What’s happening?”
...The FDR data indicated that the engine start lever switches for both engines moved from the run to the cutoff position between 0150:21 and 0150:23.19
Between 0150:24 and 0150:27, the throttle levers moved from their idle position to full throttle, the speedbrake handle moved to its fully deployed position, and the left elevator surface moved from a 3º nose-up to a 1º nose-up position, then back to a 3º nose-up position. During this time, the CVR recorded the captain asking, “What is this? What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?”
Also, at 0150:26.55, the captain stated, “Get away in the engines,” and, at 0150:28.85, the captain stated, “shut the engines.”
At 0150:29.66, the relief first officer stated, “It’s shut.”
Between 0150:31 and 0150:37, the captain repeatedly stated, “Pull with me.”
However, the FDR data indicated that the elevator surfaces remained in a split condition (with the left surface commanding nose up and the right surface commanding nose down) until the FDR and CVR stopped recording at 0150:36.64 and 0150:38.47, respectively...
FMI: http://www.ntsb.gov/events/EA990/default.htm 

Egypt Responds With Demand for Reconsideration
The Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA) challenged [the] final report of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on the loss of EgyptAir Flight 990 in October 1999. According to the ECAA, NTSB investigators failed to consider a credible body of evidence supporting multiple failures in the aircraft's elevator control system as the probable cause of the accident and, as a result, further investigation is required. The Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority announced it will formally appeal for reconsideration of the NTSB's findings of probable cause.
"We believe we owe it to the families of those aboard and to the flying public to find out what caused this tragic accident," said Nabil Fahmy, Egypt's Ambassador to the United States. "Much remains to be done."
The investigation was flawed from the outset when NTSB investigators rushed to judgment in reaching conclusions even before the aircraft wreckage was retrieved from the ocean floor, according to the ECAA.
Errors in translating words on the cockpit voice recorder caused the NTSB to focus its attention on the presumed actions of the pilot. Based on NTSB leaks and public statements, the "deliberate act" theory was perpetuated in the media. Regrettably, the NTSB never gave equal weight or consideration to other accident scenarios, based on the available evidence.
Egyptian authorities have cooperated in all aspects of the investigation.
The FBI conducted its own investigation into the would-be motive of an alleged "deliberate act" by the first officer but found no credible evidence to suggest the crash was the result of criminal intent.

The Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority cites the following examples as NTSB shortcomings in the Flight 990 investigation:

• The cause of damage to a critical valve and rivets in the airplane's elevator system has yet to be determined;
• The possibility of multiple failures to the control cables which move the elevators and determine the aircraft's upward and downward pitch;
• Unidentified sounds and words on the cockpit voice recorder have not been analyzed thoroughly;
• Egyptian investigators have not been provided access to all relevant data including radar information;
• NTSB simulator tests failed to analyze and account for gaps and inconsistencies in data provided by the aircraft's manufacturer, Boeing;
• Earlier problems with this aircraft's autopilot have not been analyzed thoroughly; and
• Expert medical evidence concerning the state of mind of the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, has been ignored by the NTSB.

The Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority also believes the NTSB has not adequately studied elevator control problems experienced by other airlines operating Boeing 767 aircraft. In fact, these incidents were identified by the ECAA and prompted the Federal Aviation Administration to issue an emergency Airworthiness Directive that required inspection of all Boeing 767s.
The Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority has maintained from the early stages of the investigation that the NTSB failed to consider all relevant evidence and to analyze correctly the evidence that was presented. In addition, the ECAA believes that, one, the NTSB investigation has not followed the spirit of Annex 13 and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Manual of Aircraft Investigation and, two, certain NTSB findings are entirely inconsistent with the Board's probable cause statement. As a result, the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority will appeal to the NTSB for reconsideration of its findings.
FMI: http://www.faa.gov/ats/aat/ifim/ifimegai.htm, http://www.hillandknowlton.com